| 公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王唯薇,陈尉纲. 公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究[J]. 当代经济管理, 2008, 30(6): 77-80 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王唯薇 陈尉纲 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆科技学院,经济系,重庆,401331;重庆大学,贸易与行政学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 以现代财经理论为出发点,建立了非对称信息条件下基于融资结构的委托代理模型,并将财务风险和经理持股两个因素纳入模型中,对模型进行了求解,研究了在此背景下的激励机制的设计,并通过时模型的分析,阐述了经理在股权激励和债务约束两种背景下的行为特征.
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| 关 键 词： | 融资结构 公司治理 委托代理 财务风险 |
The Study on the Corporate Financing Structure and the Design of Principal-Agency Mechanism |
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| Wang Weiwei,Chen Weigang. The Study on the Corporate Financing Structure and the Design of Principal-Agency Mechanism[J]. Contemporary Economic Management, 2008, 30(6): 77-80 |
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| Authors: | Wang Weiwei Chen Weigang |
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| Affiliation: | Wang Weiwei 1,Chen Weigang 2(1.Department of Economics,Chongqing University of Science , Technology,Chongqing 401331,China,2.Post doctor Active Station of Mechanical Engineering,College of Trade , Public Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing,400044,China) |
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| Abstract: | This article sets up a Principal-Agency model under asymmetrical information in view of financing structure based on the modern corporate governance theory.This model also considers the financial risk and managers' ownership.The paper studies how to design an efficient incentive mechanism.Meanwhile,it studies how the managers will act under the incentive of stock ownership and the restriction of liabilities. |
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| Keywords: | financing structure corporate governance principal-agency financial risk |
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