| 国有资产监管、委托代理与激励约束 |
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| 引用本文： | 田鹏,刘志永.国有资产监管、委托代理与激励约束[J].贵州商业高等专科学校学报,2008,21(4):9-11. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田鹏 刘志永 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东经济学院,财政金融学院,山东,济南,250014 |
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| 摘 要： | 经营者与管理者博弈过程中导致的国有资产流失，关键原因是体制转换时期体制性缺陷及对制度执行不力造成的。只有在制度上进行创新，建立起有效的实施机制，加强制度的操作与执行，才能有效解决不合作等问题，遏制违规行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有资产监管 委托代理 博弈 激励约束 |
State-owned assets Supervise、Principal-agent、Incentive and restraint |
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| Tian Peng,Liu Zhi-yong.State-owned assets Supervise、Principal-agent、Incentive and restraint[J].Journal of Guizhou Commercial College,2008,21(4):9-11. |
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| Authors: | Tian Peng Liu Zhi-yong |
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| Institution: | 1.2. Shandong Economic University, Ji＇nan, Shandong 250014) |
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| Abstract: | The loss of state assets is caused by the game of property right and operating right,the key reason for this is the Systematic defects and neakless of executive ability in transition from old economy system to new one.The way to solve this problem is establishing a new system and strengthen the executive ability. |
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| Keywords: | State-owned assets supervise Principal-agent Game Incentive and restraint |
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