Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers |
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Authors: | Susanne Goldlücke Sebastian Kranz |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7, 3-5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. |
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