Job market signaling and employer learning |
| |
Authors: | Carlos Alós-Ferrer Julien Prat |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box D-150, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany;2. Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain |
| |
Abstract: | We consider a signaling model where the sender?s continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|