Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study |
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Authors: | William E Stein Amnon Rapoport Darryl A Seale Hongtao Zhang Rami Zwick |
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Institution: | aMays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA;bDepartment of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA;cHong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong;dDepartment of Management, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV 89154, USA |
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Abstract: | We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics. |
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Keywords: | Batch queueing Equilibrium solution Experimental economics |
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