Competition Policy and Innovation

The question addressed by the paper is whether standard proceduresand widely accepted insights of competition policy remain validwhen one deals with potentially anti-competitive conduct ininnovative industries. The question of appropriateness arisesbecause competition in these industries displays features thatare radically different from those encountered in traditionalsectors of the economy. Competition is for the market ratherthan in the market, dynamic aspects of competition matter morethan allocative aspects, intellectual property rights (IPR)reinforce network effects present in knowledge-based industries.The paper examines why these differences matter with respectto market delineation, assessment of intensity of competition,and predatory conduct. It also raises the question as to whatextent competition law limits the innovators' rights not tolicense their inventions to others, especially when they correspondto essential facilities. It explores the problem created byexcessive protection as well as the hold-up problem that arisesin a context of sequential innovations. It examines the antitrustposition in regard to the treatment of collaborative arrangementsamong holders of IPRs, such as cross-licences, patent-pools,and joint-standard settings. Finally, it presents a discussionon a possible role of competition law in shaping intellectualproperty laws in order to benefit from the complementarity betweenintellectual protection and antitrust rules.