国有企业“企业家”选拔方式的经济学思考

本文侧重于从企业家的知识结构这一独特的角度来说明：现行“行政委任制”所选拔出的国有企业的“企业家”的知识结构存在重大缺陷－－来自实践经验的企业家能力部分的缺失。而且,选出之后的激励结构也不利于他们向市场型企业家的转化和其知识结构的改善。由这种“企业家”统领国有企业的直接结果,必然造成国有经济部门的低效率、资产流失和管理上的“人治”。要改变这种局面,根本的出路在于改革现行任命制度,切断企业家与行政官员之间角色互换的通道,建立市场化的企业家选择制度。

Economics Thinking on Entrepreneur Selecting Methods in the State-owned Enterprises

From the knowledge structure seized by the entrepreneur, this paper illustrates that the knowledge structure of the state-owned enterprise's entrepreneur who selected by present "administrative deputing system" is not perfection, it lack the part of entrepreneur ability which come from the experience. And the incentive structure in state-owned enterprise go against the selected entrepreneur's transforming to entrepreneur who accepted by market and completing their knowledge structure. The directive results from the management of these "entrepreneur" must be lower efficiency, asset losing and "government by men" in management of state-owner enterprises. In order to change the situation,it must change the present administrative deputing system, shut off the interchange channel between the role of entrepreneur and the role of administrator, and build the entrepreneur selecting system that select entrepreneur by market.