The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension |
| |
Authors: | Lszl Kczy Luc Lauwers |
| |
Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, NL-6200MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;bCenter for Economic Studies, Catholic University Leuven, Leuven, Belgium |
| |
Abstract: | A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. Each game generates a unique minimal (for inclusion) dominant set. This minimal dominant set is non-empty and returns the coalition structure core in case this core is non-empty. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set. |
| |
Keywords: | Dynamic solution Absorbing set Core Non-emptiness |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|