首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

制造业企业横向战略联盟稳定性的进化博弈分析
引用本文:张 峥,陈清生. 制造业企业横向战略联盟稳定性的进化博弈分析[J]. 江苏商论, 2014, 0(6): 57-62
作者姓名:张 峥  陈清生
作者单位:上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093
基金项目:基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71371124)
摘    要:由于制造业行业的特点,在现今经济和政策背景下越来越多的制造业企业选择构建战略联盟来进一步提高竞争力,但实践中不乏联盟在合作一段时间后宣布解除的案例。对这一事实现象,本文从前人相关研究的基础上,引入更科学全面的影响因子,用进化博弈论的原理和方法探讨其中的内在原因。本文研究表明,根据六种不同的因子大小关系,能够得到三种不同的进化结果。因此通过提高或减少单个因子的值,不一定能达到提高联盟稳定性的效果,而应该结合影响因子大小关系的前提进行策略的改进。

关 键 词:制造业企业  战略联盟  进化博弈

The Evolution Game Analysis on Stability of Horizontal Strategic Alliance of Manufacturing Enterprises
Zhang Zheng,Chen Qing-sheng. The Evolution Game Analysis on Stability of Horizontal Strategic Alliance of Manufacturing Enterprises[J]. Jiangsu Commercial Forum, 2014, 0(6): 57-62
Authors:Zhang Zheng  Chen Qing-sheng
Affiliation:(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093 ,China)
Abstract:Due to the characteristics of manufacturing industry, more and more manufacturing enterprises choose strategic alliance to enhance competitiveness in the current economic and policy background. But some strategic alliances ended up in dissolution after collaborate for a period of time. To explain this question, this paper use evolution game theory to explore the internal causes via introducing more scientific impact factors based on previous studies. This paper shows there may be three different game results according to six kinds of numerical relationship of impact factors. Consequently, it may not achieve the desired result of the alliance stability by increasing or reducing the value of single impact factor. Instead, the numerical relationship of impact factors should be considered as premise to improve the strategies.
Keywords:manufacturing enterprises  strategic alliance  evolution game theor
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号