Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information |
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| Authors: | Hans-Theo Normann |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Present address: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, the endogenous order of quantity decision is studied in a duopoly model with incomplete information. One firm knows the state of the demand curve while the other firm remains uninformed. Firms have to commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. While, a priori, simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria are possible, only Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, emerge endogenously. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information endogenous timing Stackelberg |
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