Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution |
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Authors: | Sang-Chul Suh Quan Wen |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ont., Canada N9B 3P4;2. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235-1819, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper studies a bargaining model where n players negotiate how to share a pie through (n−1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each session, two players bargain for a partial agreement that specifies who exits and who moves on to the next session (if there is any) via the alternating-proposal framework of Rubinstein [Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97–109]. We consider two bargaining procedures under which the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash [Nash, J., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162] bargaining solution for the corresponding bargaining problem as the players’ discount factor goes to one. Hence, the model studied here provides a non-cooperative foundation for the Nash cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case. |
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Keywords: | C72 C78 |
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