How do family ownership,control and management affect firm value? |
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| Authors: | Belen Villalonga Raphael Amit |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163, USA;2. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2012 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA |
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| Abstract: | Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms. |
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| Keywords: | G3 G32 |
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