Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games |
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Authors: | Chen-Ying Huang Tomas Sjöström |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan;2. Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA |
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Abstract: | In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s Perry, M., Reny, P., 1994. A non-cooperative view of coalition formation and the core. Econometrica 62, 795-817] non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome. |
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Keywords: | C71 C72 |
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