基于演化博弈的监测—约束—激励系统生态补偿机制研究——以旅游胜地漓江流域为例

"两山"理论要求重构"经济—环境"生态,因地制宜设计生态补偿机制。以漓江流域作为研究对象,利用演化博弈理论分析不同情境下漓江流域各主体策略的演化趋势,再使用SD进一步模拟仿真,结论如下:(1)上下游地方政府实施策略概率的初始值会影响最终的稳定状态;(2)仅依靠上下游政府的相互自发监督,不能有效实施利于生态补偿的合作机制;(3)上下游都不履行义务时的惩罚应比只有一方不履行义务时的惩罚更大,上下游履行义务时的奖励应比不实现合作时的惩罚更大;(4)当中立机构监管流域水质状态时,上游提供给下游的补贴应该比下游给上游的生态补偿更少。据此提出漓江流域生态补偿机制政策建议。

Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Monitoring-Restriction-Incentive System Based on Evolutionary Game:A Case of Tourist Resort Lijiang River Basin

The two-mountain theory requires the reconstruction of the "economic-environment" ecology and design of ecological compensation mechanisms according to local conditions.This article takes the Lijiang River Basin as the research object,and uses evolutionary game theory to establish a mathematical model for analyzing the evolution trend of the main strategies of the Lijiang River Basin under different scenarios,and then uses SD to further simulate the simulation analysis,at last draws the following main conclusions:(1) The initial value of the probability that the upstream and downstream local governments implement the strategy will affect the final stable state;(2) Only relying on the mutual spontaneous supervision of the upstream and downstream governments cannot effectively implement the cooperation mechanism conducive to ecological compensation;(3) Both upstream and downstream do not perform the penalty for obligation should be greater than the penalty for failure to perform the obligation by only one party,and the reward for fulfilling the obligation of upstream and downstream should be greater than the penalty for failure to achieve cooperation;(4) When a neutral organization monitors the water quality of the basin,the upstream provides downstream The subsidy should be less than the ecological compensation provided by the downstream to the upstream.Based on this,policy recommendations for the ecological compensation mechanism in the Lijiang River Basin are put forward.