| 增值服务价值不可验证下的TPLSP关系契约激励机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 张旭梅,金亮,但斌,宋寒. 增值服务价值不可验证下的TPLSP关系契约激励机制[J]. 技术经济, 2010, 29(1): 113-117 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张旭梅 金亮 但斌 宋寒 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家“863”计划资助课题(2007AA040801) |
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| 摘 要： | 由第三方物流服务提供商(TPLSP)提供服务外包已成为制造业企业在快速变化环境下应对不确定性的一种战略选择。本文针对物流服务外包过程中一些增值服务项目的价值具有难以描述性和不可验证性的特点,设计了基于委托-代理理论的关系契约激励机制,分析了贴现因子对关系契约激励效果的影响。研究结论表明:关系契约能有效激励TPLSP努力工作,且当贴现因子足够大时,关系契约能激励TPLSP实施最优努力,实现服务产出的系统最优。
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| 关 键 词： | 服务外包 增值服务 不可验证 关系契约 激励机制 |
Relational Contract and Incentive Mechanism with TPLSP under Unverifiability of Value-added Service |
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| Zhang Xumei,Jin Liang,Dan Bin,Song Han. Relational Contract and Incentive Mechanism with TPLSP under Unverifiability of Value-added Service[J]. Technology Economics, 2010, 29(1): 113-117 |
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| Authors: | Zhang Xumei Jin Liang Dan Bin Song Han |
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| Affiliation: | College of Economics and Business Administration/a>;Chongqing University/a>;Chongqing 400044/a>;China |
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| Abstract: | It has been a strategic choice that manufacturers outsource non-core business process to third party logistics provider in order to respond to the non-determinacy in quick changing environment.Focused on the intangibility and the unverifiability of some value-added service in logistics outsourcing,a relational contract is designed with principal-agent theory,and the incentive effect of discount rate on the relational contract is analyzed.The conclusion implies that the relational contract can incent TPLSP t... |
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| Keywords: | service outsourcing value-added service unverifiability relational contract incentive mechanism |
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