论可置信性威胁在反倾销动态博弈中的应用

近30年来国际反倾销案激增使得诸多学者对WTO关于反倾销的相关规定表示质疑。现行的乌拉圭回合《反倾销守则》尚存诸多缺陷。正处于转型时期的中国作为当前美欧等发达国家反倾销的主要对象,急需掌握反倾销动态博弈规则以及反倾销概率、高额关税、市场份额萎缩的预期及市场行为举证费用等可置信性威胁因素在动态博弈中的运用,以便在国际反倾销中争取积极主动的地位。

The Application of Reliable Threat to Dynamic Anti-dumping Game

In recent 30 years the increase of the international anti-dumping cases caused many researchers to question on the WTO rules as to anti-dumping. There still exist some defects in "Antidumping Rules" of Uraguay Round. Since China, undergoing the transforming peviod, is currently targeted by some advanced European and American countries, it is more urgent to master the rules of dynamic anti-dumping game, the probability, high tariff, the expectation of shrinking market share, quoting cost of market behavior, etc. These elements of reliable thrent can be applied to the practice to gain an advantageous position in the international anti-dumping cases.