The WTO dispute settlement system: a first assessment from an economic perspective

We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigationwithin the new WTO dispute settlement system. Our analysis yieldsa number of interesting predictions, First, because sanctionsare ruled out during the litigation process, the dispute settlementsystem does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However,the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including itsright to force a decision, make trade restrictions less attractivethan under the WTO's predecessor, GATT. Second, the system'sappellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentivesto delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibilityto signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relativelyweak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentivesto violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements aremore likely at an early stage in the process and are biasedtoward the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlementprocedure. Empirical evidence based on a first dataset of casesat an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitativesupport for our claims.