| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the manner in which interest rates have been raised to, and sustained at, extremely high levels in developing and emerging market economies as a consequence of recent financial crises. By contrast rich market economies have typically lowered interest rates and injected liquidity in response to incipient financial crises. The paper first sketches the logic that lies behind extremely high interest rates (nominal and real) as an element of crisis resolution. It suggests that this reflects a money-phobic view of financial markets and also conflicts with some well-established economics. It then reviews the conventional wisdom about why richer economies have enjoyed sustained price stability in recent years and why this in turn has allowed their monetary authorities to be relaxed about injecting additional liquidity in response to LTCM (1998) and September 11 (2001)-type crises. It is pointed out that this conventional wisdom is also money-phobic in that it neglects the build up of corporate and government debt in bond and financial derivative form that has been associated with recent financial developments. This analysis helps to contest the common view that emerging market economies pay a higher price merely because their polices are "bad'. Finally, the paper reviews the manner in which the financial systems of developing and emerging market economies respond to the destabilization created by corrosively high real rates of interest. Even when bankruptcy arrangements are well established, certain new forms of financial flows and instruments are implicit in this response, but are invariably ignored in formal modelling. |
