Reciprocity and voting |
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Authors: | Volker Hahn |
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Affiliation: | aCER-ETH, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D13, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages. |
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Keywords: | Reciprocity Voting Median voter theorem |
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