"效率工资"与保险代理问题

道德风险是保险业长期存在的难题.其中保险代理人欺诈问题在我国目前保险市场较为混乱、诚信体系尚未健全的情况下显得尤为突出.本文在建立代理人、委托人、自然先后行动的不完全信息动态博弈模型的基础上,结合"效率工资"理论,分析了保险公司如何激励保险代理人按照公司的利益行动的问题.在研究博弈的第二阶段--委托人选择时,本文进一步分析了委托人的代理成本问题,同时建立委托人最优监督水平模型.文章的最后,笔者结合文章模型的各个参数,提出了抑制代理人欺诈倾向的建议.

Issues Regarding "Efficiency-Related Wages" and Insurance Agent

Moral risk is a longstanding problem in insurance industry. Frauds committed by insurance agents are not uncommon in our current insurance market. This is especially noticeable when our credit system is yet to come into shape. On the basis of incomplete information dynamic gaming model involving agents, principals and nature who tend to act at different times and with reference to "efficiency-related wages," an analysis is given of how to encourage insurance agents to act in the interest of an insurance company. Regarding the choice of agents by the principal--the second gaming stage, the cost of agents is considered and an optimum model is established enabling the principal to carry out supervision. Finally, a suggestion of containing agents' tendency to act fraudulently is advanced, using the parameters from the model in the paper.