大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据

在上市公司配股融资过程中，大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本，基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征，并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为；（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系：当第一大股东持股比例低于53．20％时表现出正相关关系，而当第一大股东持股比例高于53．20％时则表现出负相关关系；（3）盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系．而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。

Control of the Largest Shareholder and Earnings Management: Evidences from Stock Dividends

China's listed companies have strong incentive to manage earnings upward by altering discretionary accruals to gain the rights issues and raise stock prices. This paper selects 456 firms with stock dividends through 1998 to 2002 as sample and examines the time-series distribution of earnings management around the offerings based on the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model, and investigates the relationship between discretionary accruals and the control of the largest shareholder. The results suggest that listed companies, on average, have high positive discretionary accruals in 3 years preceding and the year of stock dividends, and that there is an inverse U -shape relation between earnings management and the largest shareholder' s share. The results also show that there is an inverse relation between earnings management and three factors (2-10 large shareholders' concentration, debt ratio and capital expenditure, while there is a positive relation between earnings management and two factors (CEO' s shares and firm size). The largest shareholder expropriates small investors through earnings management, and firm' s value, reputation and refinancing capability are heavily damaged.