经济责任审计治理权力“期权化”研究

在以公共选择理论和博弈论作为权力“期权化”的理论基础上，分析了权力“期权化”腐败查处率对社会公众的信号效应，指出公共权力是经济责任审计与权力“期权化”的契合点，进而提出通过由“事”到“人”、由“物”到“人”、由“人”到“事”的途径对党政领导干部进行在任、离任、任后经济责任审计，并公告经济责任审计结果，以压缩权力“期权化”空间，使领导干部不愿、不敢和不能权力“期权化”，从而规范党政领导干部的从政行为，发挥国家审计在经济社会健康运行的免疫系统功能。

Research on Economic Accountability Auditing for the Option of Power

With the continuous strengthening of anti corruption efforts, the phenomenon of the option of power appears. By using the Public Choice Theory and Game Theory, this article analyzes the signal effect of the corruption investigation rate related to the power option, and points out that public power is the fit point between accountability auditing and the option of power. The practice of accountability auditing for government leading cadres in the middle and after their service term, with the results being disclosed, can compress the space for power option, prevent the corruption and regulate the political behavior of government leading cadres. It also helps the national audit to play immune function for economic and social health.