| Abstract: | Following Dierkes and Antal's (1985) model, this study examines the decision usefulness of narrative disclosures on firms' environmental performance by focusing on how investors allocate their investment funds. Using an experimental design, the study examines investors' reactions to two states of corporate environmental performance: one in which the company discloses it is performing badly with respect to the environment, and another in which the company discloses it is a leader in environmental management. The results indicate that investors, as expected, react strongly and negatively to the poor environmental performer, while somewhat less expected, there is no significant reaction to the better environmental performer. Sub-analyses, however, reveal ‘environmental clientele’ effects. For the poor environmental performer, investors who specifically mention environmental performance react even more strongly and negatively than those who make no mention of environmental performance. In the case of the better environmental performer, the reactions are more complex. For those investors who specifically mention the firm's environmental performance, two opposite reactions result. While one group positively invests in the company for its environmental leadership, the other group avoids investing in the company for what it appears to consider excessive and unnecessary expenditure. The results from this study are consistent with the widespread observation that firms will rarely disclose poor environmental performance unless required to do so. Moreover, the mixed reactions to the better environmental performer could also partly explain why firms appear willing to report their positive environmental achievements in only vague and general terms. |
