Unionization,product market competition,and strategic disclosure |
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Authors: | Daniel Aobdia Lin Cheng |
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Affiliation: | 1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2211 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208, United States;2. Eller College of Management, The University of Arizona, 1130 E. Helen Street, Tucson, AZ 85721, United States |
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Abstract: | We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures. |
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Keywords: | Disclosure Information transfer Labor unions Product market competition Proprietary costs M40 M41 J51 J52 |
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