The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization

Two of the major policy problems facing governments of developingcountries in the 1980s have been unsustainable external andinternal disequilibria, and implementation of politically feasiblestabilization cum liberalization programs which become necessaryto correct these imbalances. This article discusses these "crises"and subsequent policy reform. The analysis suggests that balanceof payments and fiscal deficits are frequently the result ofuse of an incorrect accounting system in a fixed exchange rateeconomy, and of public sector expansion beyond its economicallyfeasible size; that governments usually seek to liberalize theireconomies during a crisis to regain control when the growthof the "transfer State" has led to generalized tax resistance,avoidance, or evasion; that reduction of the government rolewill be required to alleviate these crises; that sharp departuresfrom past policies rather than gradual reform may be politicallynecessary; and that, contrary to the current technocratic opinionon this matter, the sequencing of a consistent and crediblepackage of reforms which will most effectively reduce the costsof adjustment is initial liberalization of domestic capitalmarkets simultaneous with cuts in the fiscal deficit, followedby floating the exchange rate and then commodity market liberalization.