| 风险投资项目选择的信号传递博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 张婕. 风险投资项目选择的信号传递博弈[J]. 价值工程, 2005, 24(10): 126-128 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张婕 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学商学院,南京,210098 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文分析了创新企业向风险投资公司传递信号(商业计划书)对价值评估结果的影响,运用信号传递博弈模型指出商业计划书在风险投资公司选择创新企业过程中的重要性,给出了风险投资公司在选择项目时的相关建议,为风险投资公司进一步量化风险和预期投资收益提供思路和思考。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 商业计划书 信号传递博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-4311（2005）10-0126-03 |
A Signaling Game of Selecting Projects in Venture Capital |
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| Zhang Jie. A Signaling Game of Selecting Projects in Venture Capital[J]. Value Engineering, 2005, 24(10): 126-128 |
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| Authors: | Zhang Jie |
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| Affiliation: | College of International Business, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China |
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| Abstract: | The influence of the signal (commerce plan), which is passed from new companies to the venture capital companies, is analyzed. The importance of commerce plan during the course of venture capital companies selecting new companies is pointed out by the signaling game model. Correlation advices are presented to the venture capital companies when they select projects. Clues and suggestions are provided for the venture capital companies to evaluate venture and anticipatory in investment return more positively. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital commerce plan signaling game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
