政府研发补贴政策的有效性研究

基于博弈的视角，分析了信息不对称条件下政府研发补贴政策的有效性，在此基础上，构建了一个政府能够识别企业研发行为“真伪”的甄别机制。研究结果表明：在信息对称的情况下，政府研发补贴政策可以降低企业研发活动的成本，起到激励企业投资于研发活动的效果；在信息不对称的情况下，政府应该加强对企业“伪研发”行为的稽查和处罚力度，以提高政府研发补贴政策的有效性。

A Study on Effectiveness of Government R&D Subsidy Policy

Based on the analysis on game between the enterprise and the government,this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the policy on government R&D subsidy under information asymmetry,and proposes an information-discriminating mechanism.The result shows that,under information symmetry,the government could reduce costs of R&D by offering subsidies effectively to encourage the enterprise to invest in R&D;however,under information asymmetry,the government should strengthen to check and punish ‘sham R&D behavior’ to improve the effectiveness of the government R&D subsidy policy.