| Abstract: | We describe briefly a model of Huntington's disease (HD), a highly penetrant, dominantly inherited, fatal neurological disorder. Although it is a single-gene disorder, mutations are variable in their effects, depending on the number of times that the CAG trinucleotide is repeated in a certain region of the HD gene. The model covers: (a) rates of onset, depending on CAG repeat length as well as age; (b) post-onset rates of mortality; and (c) the distribution of CAG repeat lengths in the population. Using these, we study the critical illness and life insurance markets. We calculate premiums based on genetic test results that disclose the CAG repeat length, or more simply on a family history of HD. These vary widely with age and policy term; some are exceptionally high, but in a large number of cases cover could be offered within normal underwriting limits. We then consider the possible costs of adverse selection, in terms of increased premiums, under various possible moratoria on the use of genetic information, including family history. These are uniformly very small, because of the rarity of HD, but do show that the costs would be much larger in relative terms if family history could not be used in underwriting. We point out some difficulties involved in applying a moratorium that recognises simply a dichotomy between ‘carriers’ and ‘non-carriers’ of any mutation in a gene when these mutations are, in fact, very variable in their effects. These complexities suggest that restrictions on the disclosure, rather than on the use, of genetic information, if it became established as a principle, could deprive insurers of information needed for risk management even if not used in underwriting. |
