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From teleology to evolution
Authors:Siegfried?Berninghaus  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:Siegfried.Berninghaus@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de"   title="  Siegfried.Berninghaus@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author,Werner?Güth,Hartmut?Kliemt
Affiliation:(1) Lehrstuhl für Volkswisrtschaftslehre III, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Postfach 69 80, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany;(2) Strategic Interaction, Group, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Kahlaische Straße 10, 077745 Jena, Germany;(3) Fakultät 2, Fach Philosophie, Gebäude LF, Gerhard-Mercator-Universität-Duisburg, Lotharstraße 65, 47048 Duisburg, Germany
Abstract:This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming "zero-intelligence" and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for "selective" adaptation, the indirect evolutionary approach integrates both perspectives. Subsequently we go stepwise "from teleology to evolution" and thereby study the model spectrum ranging from pure rational choice over indirect to direct evolutionary approaches. We believe that knowledge of this spectrum can help us to choose more adequate models of economic behavior that incorporate both teleological and evolutionary elements.JEL Classification: C72, B52, B59We gratefully acknowledge the very helpful constructive comments, corrections and the encouragement of our referee. Of course, the conventional disclaimer applies.Correspondence to: S. Berninghaus
Keywords:Indirect evolution  Rational choice  Trust game  Information
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