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会计政策选择行为特征研究
引用本文:陈炳辉,黄文锋.会计政策选择行为特征研究[J].广东商学院学报,2006(3):58-61.
作者姓名:陈炳辉  黄文锋
作者单位:广东金融学院,会计系,广东,广州,510521
摘    要:由于市场上存在着机会主义,导致以节约交易费用的企业出现;企业的出现又把机会主义从市场带到企业内部。为减少企业内的机会主义,必须让人力资本分享剩余索取权。由于人力资本特殊的产权特征,导致企业出现产权的公共领域,剩余分享没有客观的标准,只能对人力资本采取各种激励措施。而奖金和期权收益与盈余大小以及股价高低直接相关,从而激发管理者操纵盈余的动机。这样为减少企业内部的机会主义,又把机会主义从生产领域带到计量领域。

关 键 词:企业内机会主义  人力资本  剩余索取权  会计政策选择
文章编号:1008-2506(2006)03-0058-04
收稿时间:2006-03-24
修稿时间:2006年3月24日

Research on Accounting Policy Choice Behavior Characteristic
CHEN Bing-hui,HUANG Wen-feng.Research on Accounting Policy Choice Behavior Characteristic[J].Journal of Guangdong Business College,2006(3):58-61.
Authors:CHEN Bing-hui  HUANG Wen-feng
Abstract:Opportunism in the market leads to the existence of enterprises oriented at saving trading expenses, while the emergence of such enterprises brings opportunism back from market to enterprises. To reduce opportunism inside enterprises, manpower capital must be given a share of surplus obtaining power. Because of the special property of manpower capital, the public realm of property is resulted in enterprises surplus sharing has no objective standard, and all incentives should be introduced to manpower capital. While bonus and share option earnings are directly related to the price of shares, the motive of managers manipulating surplus is sparked, thus bringing opportunism back from the production realm to measurement realm.
Keywords:opportunism inside enterprise  manpower capital  surplus obtaining power  accounting policy choice
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