商业银行贷款审查委员会制度效率缺失研究--由段晓兴案引发的思考

目前我国的商业银行,尤其是大型国有商业银行和国家控股商业银行普遍采用贷款审查委员会制度。该制度在一定程度上提高了商业银行的新增贷款质量,有着以前个人审贷制度无法企及的优越性。但是,该制度在运行中亦暴露出许多问题,如“偷懒”、“搭便车”现象、不良贷款问责难以落实、审贷质量不高、行政色彩浓厚等现象。本文结合相关经济理论对贷款审查委员制度运行过程中暴露出的效率缺失问题进行了深层次研究,揭示了贷审会运作的“团队生产性”和相关配套制度的不完善造成的该制度程序上的效率缺失,并有针对性地提出了一系列解决方法。

Deficiency of the Loan Inspection Committee System for Commercial Banks'--some thought inspired by the case of Duan Xiaoxing

Currently, loan inspection committee system is generally adopted by commercial banks, especially by state-owned and state-controlled commercial banks. Such system improves to some extent the quality of newly-increased loans and has incomparable advantage over individual inspection system in the past. However, problems have also surfaced such as "loafing on the job", "hitchhiking", difficulty in practising the responsibility system of bad loans, low inspection quality and strong administrative color. This paper deals thoroughly with the problem of deficiency in the work of the loan inspection committee system by using relevant economic theory and reveals "team productivity" of inspection committee and deficiency in the system procedure due to incomplete auxiliary systems. Solutions are provided.