| 分次赎货模式下银行对物流企业的激励研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 李敏.分次赎货模式下银行对物流企业的激励研究[J].价值工程,2012,31(3):10-11. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 李敏 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理与经济学部,天津,300072 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文基于信息不对称理论分析了存货质押融资业务中以货易货的分次赎货模式,设计了银行规避换入销货物风险的激励模型。就目前银行与物流企业所采用的三种合约进行讨论,计算出了银行在采取三种不同合约时的最优激励函数以及在该激励函数下,物流企业的努力水平。
|
| 关 键 词： | 不对称信息 分次赎货 委托代理 激励合约 |
Bank's Incentive Model to Logistics Enterprises in Multiple Redemption of Stock |
| |
| Li Min.Bank's Incentive Model to Logistics Enterprises in Multiple Redemption of Stock[J].Value Engineering,2012,31(3):10-11. |
| |
| Authors: | Li Min |
| |
| Institution: | Li Min(School of Management,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the asymmetric information theory,the paper analyses the multiple redemption of stock model in inventory financing and designs the incentive model for banks to reduce the risk of changing into the unsalable goods.Calculation of the banks′ optimal incentive function and the logistics enterprises′ working level under different kind of contract is given out. |
| |
| Keywords: | asymmetric information multiple redemption of stock principle-agent incentive contracts |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
