Exchange-rate regimes for emerging markets: moral hazard and international overborrowing

This paper investigates the role of the exchange-rate regimein a simple Fisherian model of the overborrowing syndrome. Wheredomestic banks are subject to moral hazard, the choice of exchange-rateregime may have important implications for the macroeconomicstability of the economy. Banks that enjoy government guaranteeshave an incentive to increase foreign borrowing and incur foreign-exchangerisks that are underwritten by the deposit insurance system.In the absence of capital controls, this increases the magnitudeof overborrowing and leaves the economy both more vulnerableto speculative attack and more exposed to the real economicconsequences of such an attack. While 'bad' exchange-rate pegswill tend to exacerbate the problem of overborrowing in emergingmarkets, it is unclear that flexible exchange rate always dominatesfixed exchange rates. A 'good fix' - one that is credible andclose to purchasing power parity - may reduce the 'super riskpremium' in domestic interest rates and thereby narrow the marginof temptation for banks to overborrow internationally. Contraryto the current consensus regarding the lessons that should bedrawn from the Asian crisis, a good fix may better stabilizethe domestic economy while limiting moral hazard in the bankingsystem.