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A decent proposal
Authors:Email author" target="_blank">Luis?C?CorchónEmail author  Carmen?Herrero
Institution:(1) Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III, c/Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain;(2) Universidad de Alicante and IVIE, 03071 Alicante, Spain
Abstract:In this paper we explore the notion that players are ldquodecentrdquo in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation.JEL Classification: D78, D63The authors wish to express their gratitude for comments and suggestions to N. Baigent, S. Baliga, V. Bashkar, C. Beviá, S. Chattopadhayay, G. Charness, M. Maschler, C. Matutes, P. McAfee, I. Ortuño-Ortín, A. Rangel, J. Roemer, J. Schummer, T. Sjöström, W. Thomson, the participants in seminars in Hakone (Japan), Harvard, Queenrsquos University, Rochester, Studienzentrum at Gergenzee (Switzerland), two anonymous referees and an associate editor. The usual caveat applies. This research has been partially supported by grants BEC2002-02194, BEC2001-0535, and GV 01-371. This paper is dedicated to Bob Aumann, from whom we have learned so much.
Keywords:Fairness constraints  implementation  bankruptcy  bargaining
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