Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination |
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Authors: | Carlo Carraro |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Venice, Venice, Italy |
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Abstract: | Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners' dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that
other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international
monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary
coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks' and governments' preferences are revealed through an analysis of their
actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers' interactions is simulated under alternative institutional
arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from
those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners' dilemma framework. Consistency is instead
found with the features of a stag-hunt game.
CEPR and FEEM
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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Keywords: | European Union monetary cooperation policy games inverse control |
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