Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions |
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| Authors: | Walter Bossert Ed Nosal Venkatraman Sadanand |
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| Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1;bDepartment of Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, N1G 2W1 |
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| Abstract: | Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78. |
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