关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据

近年的大量恶性案例表明关联交易已经成为我国上市公司治理的一个严重问题。本文在全面分析1998—2 0 0 2年间我国上市公司关联交易总体状况的基础上,从不同角度考察了关联交易与股权结构之间的关系。研究结果表明,关联交易的发生规模与股权集中度显著正相关,持股比例超过10 %的控股股东数目的增加会降低关联交易的发生金额和概率。此外,控股股东间的制衡能力越强,发生关联交易的可能性越低、金额越小。这些发现为通过增加控股股东数目,改“一股独大”为“多股同大”来改善我国上市公司治理结构、保护投资者利益的改革思路提供了实证证据

Related Party Transactions, Corporate Governance And State Ownership Reform

This study empirically examined the relationship between related party transactions and the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms. As a result, we find that the monetary amount and likelihood of the related party transactions between the largest shareholder's group and the listed company are positively correlated with the share proportion controlled by the largest shareholder. More importantly, our results show that increasing the number of controlling shareholders and decreasing the controlling gap between them will decrease the likelihood and extent of related party transactions. Our results imply that the reduction of state ownership is not the only way to improve corporate governance of the listed firms and to protect the interest of individual investors. In present stage, it might be a more feasible choice to transform the ownership structure from sole controlling shareholder to multiple controlling shareholders.