Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation |
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Authors: | Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara |
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Institution: | (1) Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8050, JAPAN (e-mail: kazr@waseda.jp) , JP;(2) Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, JAPAN (e-mail:fujiwara@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp) , JP |
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Abstract: | Summary. In this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving
rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when
an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard
in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different
in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect
further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can
precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard.
Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The authors thank the valuable comments by an anonymous referee. Ministry of Education and Science for its financial
support is also greatly acknowledged.
Correspondence to:K. Kiyono |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Global warming Emission tax Emission quota Emission standard Strategic interaction Tax exemption |
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