Effectiveness of independent boards of UCITS funds |
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Authors: | Jan Jaap Hazenberg Edwin Terink |
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Affiliation: | 1. Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg;2. ING Investment Management, The Hague, The Netherlands;3. ING Investment Management, The Hague, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | In order to protect fund investors against conflicts of interest with fund management companies, US funds have mandatory independent directors, but this obligation is not required under the European Union Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive. Nevertheless, a considerable number of UCITS funds do have independent directors. Whether independent directors should also be mandatory in Europe has been a topic of ongoing debate. Using a sample of Luxembourg UCITS, we test the hypothesis that more independent boards add value for investors through lower costs and/or better investment performance, but we fail to find supporting evidence, even for funds with a higher risk of conflicts of interest. Oversight by independent depositaries and institutional shareholders does not seem to be effective either. It appears that board attitude and the sponsor distribution model are more important since we find evidence that boards that prioritise cost monitoring have lower costs and that independent sponsor funds have better performance. These results question the effectiveness of self-regulation or formal regulation requiring independent board members. |
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Keywords: | investment funds UCITS Directive governance board independence fund costs fund performance |
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