Stability,sequential rationality,and subgame consistency |
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Authors: | Sheng-Chieh Huang Xiao Luo |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 100, Taiwan, ROC;(2) Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 115, Taiwan, ROC |
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Abstract: | In this paper we analyze dynamic strategic behavior by means of the idea of "stability." We develop a solution concept of "sequentially stable equilibrium (SSE)" that satisfies subgame consistency. All SSEs are characterized by the largest stable set that yields exactly all the backward induction outcomes. We also provide a refinement of the SSE. We compare the SSE and its refinement with some existing solution concepts in the literature We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions that led to this revision. We thank Chih Chang, Yi-Chun Chen, Chenying Huang, Huiwen Koo, Man-Chung Ng, Shyh-fang Ueng, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank participants in seminars at Academia Sinica, National Dong Hwa University, and the Third Pan-Pacific Game Theory Conference. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the National Science Council of Taiwan, and the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. |
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Keywords: | Sequential rationality Subgame consistency Stable sets SSE |
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