| IPO定价机制选择：固定价格、拍卖与累计投标 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨记军.IPO定价机制选择：固定价格、拍卖与累计投标[J].经济管理,2006(10):55-58. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨记军 |
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| 作者单位： | 四川大学工商管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目（NCET-04-0883）部分研究成果. |
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| 摘 要： | 本文进一步拓展了Biais和Faugerson-Crouzet（2002）的模型。研究发现，固定价格定价机制由于不能收集投资者关于股票的真实信息，其抑价水平往往高于拍卖（统一价格拍卖）以及累计投标定价这三种定价机制，只有在投资者拥有的私人信号全部是坏信号的情况下，三者之间的抑价水平才会一致。拍卖与累计投标的抑价水平差异取决于投资者的理性约束行为。
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| 关 键 词： | IPO 定价机制 固定价格 拍卖 累计投标 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-5766（2006）10-0055-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-03-01 |
Choice of IPO Mechanisms:Fixed Price, Auctions, and Book-building |
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| YANG Ji-jun.Choice of IPO Mechanisms:Fixed Price, Auctions, and Book-building[J].Economic Management,2006(10):55-58. |
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| Authors: | YANG Ji-jun |
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| Institution: | YANG Ji-jun |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we develop a model based on Biais and Faugerson-Crouzet (2002) . The model suggests the underprcing of IPOs in autions and book-building mechanisms are both lower than the one in fixed price mechnism, except for the signals from the informed institutional investors are all bad. The reason for this is that the underwriter cannot inquire the infromation from investors in fixed mecanism. The diffrence of underpricing in autions and book-building mechanisms is determited by investors' s national constriants. |
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| Keywords: | IPO pricing mechanisms fixed price auctions book-building |
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