首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

独立董事选用与盈余管理监控有效性分析
引用本文:陈亮. 独立董事选用与盈余管理监控有效性分析[J]. 商业研究, 2011, 0(11): 64-68
作者姓名:陈亮
作者单位:广东金融学院会计系;
基金项目:广东省哲学社会科学规划项目,项目编号:09GE-04
摘    要:作为我国公司治理机制的重要组成部分,独立董事制度的有效性对制约公司盈余管理行为至关重要,如果独立董事是自愿性选用的,董事会的独立性就会降低盈余管理;如果独立董事是强制性选用的,董事会的独立性程度较高与较低的盈余管理是不相关的。因此,董事会的独立性可以有效地监控盈余管理,但监控扭曲了独立董事的市场环境,这会导致治理机制失效。所以,我国监管机构通过不断完善公司治理机制,以应对国际金融市场不断反复的波动和冲击。

关 键 词:独立董事  盈余管理  可操纵应计利润

Analysis of Selection of Independent Director Monitoring on the Effectiveness of Earnings Management
CHEN Liang. Analysis of Selection of Independent Director Monitoring on the Effectiveness of Earnings Management[J]. Commercial Research, 2011, 0(11): 64-68
Authors:CHEN Liang
Affiliation:CHEN Liang(Accounting Department,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China)
Abstract:As an important part of China’s corporate governance mechanism,the effectiveness of the system of independent director is essential to constraint company’s earnings management behavior.If the independent director is voluntary and optional,the independence of board of director will reduce earnings management;If the independent director is mandatory,a higher degree of board independence and lower earnings management is not relevant.Accordingly,the board can effectively monitor the independence of earnings management,but the independent director monitor distorted market environment,which will lead to governance failure.Therefore,our regulators continue to improve corporate governance through mechanisms to cope with the international financial market volatility and the constant impact.
Keywords:independent director  earnings management  rulable accruals  
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号