| 道德风险、激励机制与电力行业规制 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴一平. 道德风险、激励机制与电力行业规制[J]. 商业研究, 2006, 36(3): 127-129 |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴一平 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海财经大学,国际工商管理学院,上海,200439 |
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| 摘 要： | 电力行业由于具有一定的自然垄断性,规制者与被规制企业之间存在严重信息不对称问题,因而成为规制的重要行业之一。所以必须对电力行业规制理论进行研究,从历史变迁的角度对中国电力行业规制制度进行考察,发现其中存在的问题,并且运用道德风险情况下的规制模型对中国电力行业规制进行分析,从而提出中国电力行业规制改革的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 道德风险 激励机制 规制 电力行业 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2006)03-0127-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-11-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-11-04 |
Moral Hazard, Incentive Mechanism and Regulation in Electricity Industry |
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| WU Yi-ping. Moral Hazard, Incentive Mechanism and Regulation in Electricity Industry[J]. Commercial Research, 2006, 36(3): 127-129 |
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| Authors: | WU Yi-ping |
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| Affiliation: | School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200439, China |
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| Abstract: | Electricity industry is a natural monopoly industry to some extent which cause information asymmetry between regulator and regulated enterprise.By studying the current electricity industry regulations electricity industry regulatory institutions,and especially historically reviewing the past,it applies the model of regulation on the condition of asymmetric information to analyze China electricity industry regulation,which may be good reference to the reform of Chinese electricity industry. |
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| Keywords: | moral hazard incentive mechanism regulation electricity industry |
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