On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a ‘Feedback-Stackelberg’ solution of a differential game model of capitalism |
| |
Authors: | Tamer Ba?ar Alain Haurie Gianni Ricci |
| |
Institution: | University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA;GERAD, Ecole des Nautes Etudes Commerciales, Montreál, Canada N3T 1 V;University of Modena, Modena, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | This paper deals with a modified version of the Lancaster model of capitalism, where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players (workers versus capitalists) and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers. It is shown that a Feedback- Stackelberg solution, with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period, is a solution dominating the Feedback-Nash solution. The paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the Feedback-Stackelberg solution, a concept not so often used by economic modelers. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|