Knowledge sharing and safeguarding in R&D collaborations: The role of steering committees in biotechnology alliances |
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Authors: | Shivaram V Devarakonda Jeffrey J Reuer |
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Institution: | 1. Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands;2. Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado |
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Abstract: | Research Summary: This research contributes to alliance governance research by demonstrating how partners' administrative controls in nonequity collaborations regulate knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board‐like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. We illuminate governing committees as an important, albeit neglected, instrument for administrative control in the governance of non‐equity alliances, and we demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior. This study extends alliance governance research beyond the implications of the equity‐nonequity dichotomy to consider a wider and richer gamut of governance instruments available to address the challenges associated with knowledge transfers in alliances. Managerial Summary: Non‐equity alliances are important vehicles to collaborate with external partners, particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry and other high‐tech sectors. To guide these collaborations effectively, partners can use the contract to custom‐build jointly‐staffed managerial units with clearly demarcated decision‐making responsibilities. We demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees also safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner values a firm's knowledge highly, or it possesses the required ability to absorb and assimilate a firm's knowledge. Our results imply that contractually‐defined managerial interfaces provide a channel to regulate knowledge‐sharing in collaborative alliances. |
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Keywords: | biotechnology economics joint committees knowledge transfer R&D alliances transaction cost |
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