Which institutional investors matter for firm survival and performance? |
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| Institution: | 1. King''s College, University of Western Ontario, Canada;2. Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College, United States;3. A Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Riverside, United States;1. Institute of Financial Analysis, University of Neuchâtel, Rue A.-L. Breguet 2, Neuchâtel, Switzerland;2. Département de finance, assurance et immobilier, Université Laval, Québec, Canada;3. Solvay Business School, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium;4. Faculty of Economics and Business, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands;5. KU Leuven, Campus Carolus Antwerpen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Korte Nieuwstraat 33, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium;1. Bank of Canada, 234 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1A 0G9;2. Bank of Canada, Canada;3. Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan;1. College of Business Administration, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA;2. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, PR China;3. Sam and Irene Black School of Business, Pennsylvania State Univeristy at Erie, Erie, PA 16563, USA;1. Department of Innovation and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea;2. School of Business Administration, Hongik University, Seoul, Republic of Korea |
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| Abstract: | Using data that spans three decades, we assess the diverse roles of institutional investors in impacting survival and performance of chronically underperforming firms and contrast the results for consistently overperforming firms. We find material differences in investor roles and investment returns between these samples. Differentiating among institutional types, controlling for prior performance and attrition bias provides insights unattainable by examining aggregated holdings. For underperformers, results are negative for activist pension funds and long-term institutions, positive for activist hedge funds and short-term institutions, and mixed for institutional blockholders. |
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| Keywords: | Institutional investors Corporate governance Monitoring Acquisition Bankruptcy Distressed firms |
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