首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Do aircraft perquisites cause CEOs to withhold bad news?
Institution:1. Department of Communication Engineering, Shenzhen University, China;2. Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;1. Economics and Management School, Center for Macroeconomic Research & Policy Evaluation, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;2. School of Social Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi''an Jiaotong University, Xi''an, Shaanxi, China;2. School of Accounting, Xijing University, Xi''an, Shaanxi, China;3. Centre for Research in Accounting, Accountability, and Governance (CRAAG), Department of Accounting, Southampton Business School, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom;1. College of Management, Yuan Ze University, 135 Yuan-Tung Road, Taoyuan, Taiwan\n;2. College of Management and Innovation Center for Big Data and Digital Convergence, Yuan Ze University, 135 Yuan-Tung Road, Taoyuan, Taiwan\n;1. School of Accounting and Finance, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong;2. Lee Shau Kee School of Business and Administration, Open University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Abstract:This paper explores the relation between management forecasts and expensive perquisites. We investigate Yermack's (2006) conjecture that managers withhold bad news in order to receive expensive perquisites. We provide direct evidence supporting Yermack's (2006) conjecture. The frequency and magnitude of bad news release is greater than that of good news after the chief executive officer (CEO) first discloses aircraft perks. In addition, managers with greater numbers of disclosed perks are more inclined to withhold bad news. Additional subsample analyses provide further support for managerial bad news withholding behavior.
Keywords:Executive compensation  Perquisites  Corporate jets  Management forecasts
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号