Self-reinforcing market dominance |
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Authors: | Daniel Halbheer Ernst Fehr Lorenz Goette Armin Schmutzler |
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Affiliation: | aUniversity of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland;bUniversity of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland;cUniversity of Geneva, Department of Economics, 40 bd du pont d'Arve, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland;dUniversity of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers. |
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Keywords: | Cost-reducing investment Asymmetric oligopoly Increasing dominance Experimental study |
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