垄断竞争与合作的非对称重复博弈

本文讨论了多个企业参与市场形成垄断竞争时的无限重复博弈问题,企图揭示各企业成本分布的离散程度对企业合作的影响。在垄断竞争的条件下,当局中人(企业)的成本函数各不相同时,以无名氏定理为代表的可行性定理不能帮助我们分析各企业偏离合作的微观动机。本文的研究表明,在成本不对称的博弈中,选择触发策略时要考虑的因素比双寡头对称博弈的情形远为复杂,其中多企业成本的变异成为影响博弈解的一个重要因素。

Asymmetric Repeated Games of Monopolistic Competition and Cooperation

The present paper deals with the infinite repeatative game theory on the monopolistic competition involving several corporations,aiming to make clear the influence of discrete level of the cost distribution within different corporations on their cooperation.Under the condition of monopolistic competition,the feasibility theorem,such as Folk Theorem,could not determine the micro motives of different corporations deviating from cooperation.The present work suggests that in the game with asymmetric cost,the use of triggering strategy is by far the more complicated than the case of dual-oligarch symmetric game,of which the cost variance becomes an important factor in the resolution of game theory.