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会计收益的持续性与高管薪酬
引用本文:李粟.会计收益的持续性与高管薪酬[J].重庆商学院学报,2009,19(2):95-99.
作者姓名:李粟
作者单位:贵州财经学院会计学院,贵州贵阳550004
摘    要:运用中国沪市1999--2006年的相关数据,检验会计收益的持续性对高管薪酬相对于会计业绩敏感性的影响,结果表明,高管薪酬对会计业绩的敏感性随着会计收益中所包含的持久性强度的增加而增加。这一结果支持了基于会计收益的高管薪酬合同能够激励管理者创造股东长期价值的观点。

关 键 词:代理理论  会计盈余  会计收益持续性  高管薪酬

Accounting Earnings Persistence and CEO Wages
LI Su.Accounting Earnings Persistence and CEO Wages[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Commerce,2009,19(2):95-99.
Authors:LI Su
Institution:Accounting School;Guizhou College of Finance and Economics;Guizhou Guiyang 550004;China
Abstract:In this paper,we justify that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings varies with earning persistence through the data from 1999 to 2006 of Shanghai Market,China.The results show that the sensitivity of CEO wages to accounting earning increases with the increase of persistence strength in accounting earnings and support the views that CEO compensation based on earnings encourages executive to increase stockholders' wealth.
Keywords:agency theory  accounting earnings  earning persistence  executive wages  
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